Expanding the number of U.S. district judgeships is often justified as a response to expanding caseloads. Increasing judgeships during unified government, however, allows Congress and the President to engage in political (patronage and ideological) control of the federal district courts. This paper examines empirically the relative importance of caseload pressure and political motives for Congress to expand the number of federal district judgeships. We demonstrate that politics dominates the timing of judgeship expansion in the U.S. District Courts. We also show that both politics and caseload affect the actual size of those timed expansions. In particular, we find that before 1970, Congress seemed to have strong political motivations for the size of an expansion.
INTRODUCTION
The legislative and executive branches of government hold considerable power over the federal judiciary, whether it be through budget restrictions, 1 appointment powers, 2 or legislative overrides. 3 Recently, scholars have considered whether the creation of judgeships is also a product of partisan efforts to control the judiciary rather than a public-spirited attempt to satisfy the growing caseload pressures on courts. There is now some evidence, both at the appellate and Supreme Court levels, that partisan politics do influence the timing and size of federal judicial expansions by Congress. 4 One finding of a recent study by de Figueiredo and Tiller found that the timing of congressional decisions to expand the judiciary was a function of unified government (partisan alignment among the legislative and executive branches of government). 5 More specifically, they found that the creation of judgeships was more likely to occur under periods of partisan alignment among the sitting President, House, and Senate (along with the expected appointing President and confirming Senate, if appointments were to straddle election cycles) than when divided government existed. The logic underpinning that study was that if politics mattered in judicial expansion decisions, the enacting House and Senate would be more inclined to pass expansion legislation when they knew the President and confirming Senate would appoint and confirm like-minded partisans. There is good reason to believe that such partisan court packing efforts by Congress and the President would pay off in terms of policy outcomes (ideological control). There are numerous studies showing that Democratic appointees produce more liberal decisions and
Republican appointees produce more conservative decisions. 6 It is not clear, however, that the same forces driving circuit and Supreme Court expansion efforts would affect decisions about district court expansion. First, caseload may play a more important role in district court expansion than in appellate court expansion for electoral reasons. District courts interface most directly with constituents.
If constituents cannot obtain a timely trial on their initial claims, they may exert more pressure on their legislators to provide more judges and courts to hear cases. Moreover, because only a fraction of cases heard in the district courts are appealed to the circuit and Supreme courts, legislators may feel less constituent pressure to provide new judges on appellate levels than they would for district courts. Second, the partisan policy benefits resulting from court packing may be greater for appellate and Supreme Court decision making than for district courts. District courts fall within the lower rung of a judicial hierarchy and are generally constrained by the higher level, broader-reaching circuit and Supreme courts. This means that legislators might be more committed to partisan control at these higher-level courts than would be for district courts. Accordingly, caseload pressure should have a comparatively larger effect on district court expansion decisions than appellate court expansion decisions, where policy concerns are more concentrated.
In addition to the policy reasons for expansion, patronage may play a role. Due to the local nature of the courts and potential for larger numbers of judgeships, expansion of the district courts offer legislators considerably more opportunities for patronage appointments than would expansion slots available at the circuit court and Supreme Court level. There is also some reason to believe that legislators might actually have greater incentives to expand district courts than circuit courts during unified government.
Partisan alignment among the House, Senate and President helps to ensure that the legislators will be able to make the patronage choices as Presidents generally draw from the recommendations of same party legislators in the state acquiring a new judgeship.
We thus have competing rationales for expansion: caseload pressure versus policypatronage concerns.
2. CASELOAD VS. POLITICS: SOME EVIDENCE Congress has passed legislation changing the size of the federal district courts more than 150 times since 1789. The district bench has expanded steadily from 13 judges in 1789 to more than 650 today. As noted above, the main contenders for explaining this federal judgeship growth are (1) constituent pressure from growing caseloads (resulting perhaps from legislative measures granting new actionable rights to citizens or a growing citizenry more generally) and (2) partisan politics (resulting from congressional desires for partisan policy control of the judiciary or from patronage opportunities for legislators).
Consider total caseload pressure first. 7 That the number of cases filed in federal district courts (caseload) and the number of federal district judgeships have both been increasing over time suggests a relationship between caseload pressure and more judgeships.
Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, other than during Prohibition (1919 Prohibition ( -1933 , the trends in caseload and judgeship growth appear to track each other quite well. This might suggest that Congress is responsive to the increasing caseloads facing the district courts, adding judgeships when and in the amount needed to maintain a smooth running judiciary.
[insert Figure 1 ] However, if we examine caseload per judge, the story is not so clear. 8 While Figure 1 shows an upward trend in both the number of judgeships and cases filed in the federal district courts, Figure 2 as the House, the House can rest assured that the "right" judges will end up on the bench.
Consequently, expansion is more likely to occur during periods of unified than divided government.
14 There is evidence to support the political expansion hypothesis. Consider Table 2 below. Between 1875 and 1993, 39 of 59 congresses authorized expansion of the federal district courts. 15 Of these 39 expansions, 28 occurred during the 34 periods of unified government; only 11 occurred during the 25 periods of divided government. We conducted a Chi-square ( χ 2 ) test, which allows us to reject the hypothesis that expansion is independent of political alignment at the 95 percent level of confidence. In addition, 387
(65%) new judgeships were authorized by unified governments during this time period, while only 206 (35%) during nonaligned governments.
[insert Table 2] We also considered the relationship of unified government to requests from the Judicial Conference. From the inception of the Judicial Conference in 1922 through 1993, when government was unified, Congress authorized 80% of the Conference's requests, as compared to but 31% under divided government.
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While this preliminary evidence suggests politics play a role in district court expansion decisions of Congress, we still are left with the question "how much" does it matter in comparison with caseload pressure. It may be that while partisan alignment significantly affects both the timing and size of the district court expansions, caseload plays an even more dominant role. Or, it may be that partisan alignment creates the opportunity for judicial expansion, but the size of that expansion is determined primarily by caseload pressure. For a better understanding of these relationships, we turn to other empirical techniques.
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

A. Method
To measure the effect of both politics (partisan alignment of the branches) and caseload on district court expansion decisions, we use a two-stage Heckman model. We also include five control variables. We run two regressions to examine the effects of caseload pressure and politics on the timing of district court expansion decisions. In the first, Timing Model 1, we examine a base model including only the caseload factors and the control variables. In Timing Model 2, we include UNIFIED GOVERNMENT as a proxy for partisan-patronage politics. Table   3 reports the results. A log-likelihood ratio test allowed us to reject the hypothesis that both models have the same explanatory power at the 99% level of confidence; Timing Model 2 performs significantly better than Timing Model 1. A positive coefficient on the variable indicates a higher probability of an increase in the number of judgeships. The standard errors are listed in parenthesis below the variables. All significance tests are two-sided asymptotic t-tests that are consistent in the presence of AR (1) Caseload pressure appears to offer little in the way of explaining the timing of district court expansion. In Timing Model 2, the coefficient on CASELOAD PER JUDGE remains insignificant, allowing us to reject the hypothesis that judicial caseload has an effect on the timing of district court expansion. The coefficient on the UNIFIED GOVERNMENT variable, however, is positive and significant as hypothesized by the partisan-patronage explanation. Indeed, unified government increases the probability of an expansion by 39 percentage points (from 55% probability to 94%) from the mean values of the variables when compared to divided government, controlling for other factors.
The coefficients on the CONSTANT, TIME SINCE LAST EXPANSION, and TREND variables remain significant in Timing Model 2 as they were in Timing Model 1.
The significance of the parameter of the TREND variable suggests that growth in population, expansion of technology, and other annual effects can have an impact on the timing of expansions of the federal district courts. The statistically significant parameter estimate of TIME SINCE LAST EXPANSION suggests that there is some pent-up demand for judgeships as time passes, pent-up demand that is not explained by increasing caseload.
The coefficient on BUDGET GROWTH is not statistically significant, suggesting that the government expands the judiciary without much concern for a federal budget constraint.
The same is true for PROHIBITION. Finally, the coefficient on NEW GOVERNMENT is close to zero in Timing Model 2, and not statistically significant. This would indicate that Congress does not expand the district court, with higher probability, in its first term of unified government than in later terms of unified government.
C. The Size Model i. The Data
In this second stage, we examine the size of a judicial expansion --that is, how many judgeships are added during an expansion. The partisanship-patronage rationale would expect larger increases during unified government expansions than during divided government expansions. The caseload hypothesis would expect the increases to be tied to judicial workload. The dependent variable is NEW JUDGESHIPS which is defined as the number of new judgeships created in each Congress from 1875 to 1993, given that there was an expansion (n = 39). As in the timing models, the two primary independent variables of interest are CASELOAD and UNIFIED GOVERNMENT. CASELOAD measures the change in cases filed since the last expansion (in thousands). If caseload pressure drives the size of an expansion, we would expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive and significant. UNIFIED GOVERNMENT is defined as before. If the partisanship-patronage explanation is correct, the coefficient on this variable should be positive and significant.
We introduce three control variables. The first, BENCH ALIGNMENT, controls for the political profile of the current district courts by measuring the percentage of the sitting bench that belongs to the party of the controlling president during that congressional term. If the current ideological make-up of the bench affects the size of an expansion, then we might see a statistically significant coefficient on this variable. The second control variable is NEW GOVERNMENT. It could be that the first period in a new government's tenure will be the time of the largest expansion because of the need to redirect judicial ideology. If so, we should expect a positive and significant coefficient on the NEW GOVERNMENT variable. A final control variable is MILLS, which is the inverse Mills ratio described earlier.
ii. Specification and Results Table 4 provides the results of the selection-corrected OLS estimation procedure. All standard errors, in parentheses below the estimated coefficients, are heteroskedasticconsistent estimates. 25 All t-statistics are reported for the two-tailed test. Both models in this section have been examined for multicollinearity and autocorrelation, and neither appears problematic. 26 Size Model 1, which explains 25% of the variance in the data, is the baseline model and includes the variables using all 39 observations of expansion. The coefficient on CASELOAD is positive and significant at the 90% level of confidence. The coefficient suggests that every 365 cases results in an additional judge. All other parameter estimates, including UNIFIED GOVERNMENT are insignificant.
[insert Table 4] If we were to stop with Size Model 1, we might conclude that the timing of judicial expansion was determined by political concerns while the actual number of judges added was determined by the amount of caseload pressure that had built up over time. One concern that may arise, however, is that the steep rise in caseload beginning in about 1970 (see Figure   1 ) may have an effect on the stability of the coefficients. In order to examine the stability of the coefficients, we conducted a Chow prediction test on the sample, separating out the earlier years from the years of substantial caseload growth beginning in the 1970s. 27 The result of the test is that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a different model is operating before 1970 and after 1970.
Thus, we separate out the expansions before 1970 (n=35) and repeat the econometric specification. The results are reported in SIZE MODEL 2. The coefficient on CASELOAD is positive, but not significant. However, the coefficient on UNIFIED GOVERNMENT is positive and significant. It indicates that political alignment will result in 9.73 additional judgeships being created in each expansion in the period prior to 1970. 28 The coefficients on all other control variables are not significant.
D. Discussion
The timing of the district court judicial expansion appears closely tied to politics.
Indeed, there is a 39 percentage point higher probability of an expansion in the district court during times of unified government than when divided government obtains. This result is consistent, though not the same magnitude, with the findings of de Figueiredo and Tiller, who have shown that in the appellate courts, caseload has no effect on the timing of expansion, and that unified government increases the probability of an expansion by 53 percentage points.
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Real differences between the appellate courts and district courts seem to occur, however, in the size of an expansion --that is, how many judges are added in an expansion.
In their earlier study, , 1983 -1991 , 48 Pol. Res. Q. 573 (1995 . Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors in parentheses * significant at the 10% level ** significant at 5% level
